We examine links between factual recall, emotion and constructions of normativity in narrative accounts, using as an empirical case President Clinton's descriptions of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. We analyse those accounts in the sequences of talk in which they occurred, under Grand Jury cross-examination. Clinton's accounts of Lewinsky were part of how he attended to issues alive in court concerning himself, including his possible exploitation and abuse of power in an asymmetrical relationship; his motives, sincerity, credibility and intentions; and, indirectly, his fitness for office as President.
6
analysis explores how Clinton handled these themes in ways that managed various interactional matters at issue in providing his testimony.
ANALYSIS
The three themes provide a way of organizing the analysis, but it is difficult to keep them strictly separate. The reason for that is that the speakers treat them alongside each other and in relation to each other, so that all three are somewhat alive in most extracts that we examine.
Theme 1: The use of limited claims to knowledge and memory
Prior to extract (1), Q (the Grand Jury questioner at this point) has noted that the witness list for the upcoming Jones trial, with Lewinsky's name on it, was published the day before an emotionally eventful visit by Lewinsky to the White House. General themes broached in the cross-examination include whether Lewinsky's testimony might be a danger to Clinton, and whether he attempted to influence that testimony, or Lewinsky's willingness to provide it.
Extract (1) in and wanted to see me (.) and couldn't, (.) 12 and was angry about it. (0.9) 14 C: I know that.
15
(1.0)
Q:
A:nd she expressed that anger to: (.) uh Betty 17 Currie over the teleph↓one isn't that correct sir.
C:
That-Betty told me that.
Q:
A:nd she then later expressed her anger to you 20 (.) in one of her telephone conversations with 21 Betty Currie is that correct?
22
(3.5) 23 C: You mean did I talk to her on the pho:ne?= 24 Q: =Monica Lewinsky that da:y, before she came in 25 to visit in the White House.
26
(12.0) 27 C: Mister Wisenberg ((C raises an index finger at 28 Q)) I remember that she came in to visit that 29 day, (0.5) I remember that she was very upset.
30
(2.5) 31 C: I don't recall whether I talked to her on the 32 phone before she came in to visit, (.) but I 33 may well have.= I'm no-not denying that I did.
34
I just don't recall that.
The narrative 'orientation' item (Labov, 1972 ) "on the morning of the sixth" (line 1) provides the relevance of events and actions that day, that they are to be told and heard in the narrative-causal context, established by Q, of the recently published list of witnesses called to testify in the Jones trial. In that made-relevant context, what were Clinton and Lewinsky so concerned about, that they got emotionally "angry" and "upset" with each other? The narrative details provided in Q's initial turn (northwest gate, Eleanor Mondale's visit) are interesting, not because of any intrinsic significance they may have, but rather for the way they signal a concern for the precise factual accuracy and specificity of the events that Clinton is being called upon to recount (cf. Edwards & Potter, 1992b) .
Q's prompt in line 6
formulates what Clinton should know, or be unable to deny (note the emphasis on 'know').
Clinton's response treats the events in question as somewhat problematical for reliable, accurate recall. The long pause before answering (line 7), the twice cut-off and then revised opening of his turn, focusing on what he can confirm that he definitely knows (again with emphatic "know", line 8, and the repetition in line 14) orients nicely to Q's expressed concern for factual accuracy. Clinton's disclaimer "apparently" (line 10) further defines his Lynch and Bogen (1996) . Memory limitations feature as a rhetorical resource, in avoiding accountability for forgotten actions, in reflexively displaying concern for strict accuracy, and in providing for 'plausible deniability' should disconfirming details subsequently emerge (Bogen & Lynch, 1989 ).
Clinton's cut-off, and the content of his repair in line 18 ("That-Betty told me that"), further display this concern for accuracy in recall, and for the sometimes indirect and therefore not fully accountable basis of what he knows. Clinton continues in this vein in lines 18-34, establishing as subject to limitations of memory and indirect knowledge whatever he is able precisely to say or confirm of events that day, as put to him by Q. Again framing his remarks within the limits of his "recollection" (line 6, and in lines 10-13), Clinton rejects Q's "you discussed…" (line 1) in favour of "she: mentioned to me:"
(line 9, also lines 14, 17-18), a version that places onus and motive on Lewinsky for raising the topic of the subpoena and her forthcoming testimony. This revised formulation, of who raised the topic, is a crucial feature of Clinton's rejection of any implication that the meeting was occasioned by a motive on his part to influence what Lewinsky's testimony might be. He goes on to deny that explicitly (lines 16-17). Indeed, any motivation to avoid giving testimony, or to reduce the scope of that testimony, was Lewinsky's. She had a "desire to avoid testifying" which Clinton, rather than prompting or encouraging, "certainly understood"
(lines 19-21). It emerges from Clinton's testimony that, within the limits of what he can recall, the major, driving motivation and responsibility for events surrounding that crucial meeting with Lewinsky were basically Lewinsky's.
The everyday categories 'remember', 'recall', 'forget', and so on, are not merely references to inner, psychological processes, but coins of verbal exchange that have a public, discursive use in managing accountability (Coulter, 1990; Lynch & Bogen, 1996) . Clearly we are not looking simply at recall on Clinton's part, in the sense of pure memory at work 3 , but at testimony produced under cross-examination -at memory as a participants' discourse category, as a social psychological phenomenon (Middleton & Edwards, 1990) . Potentially threatening implications are worked up by Q and handled, re-worked, or warded off in Clinton's responses. This echoes findings from a variety of close studies of courtroom dialogue, including Bogen and Lynch (1996) , and also Drew's (1990 Drew's ( , 1992 cf. Atkinson & Drew, 1979) demonstration of how questions and responses in court re-work descriptive content and implications for culpability. As Drew shows, it is in the details of lexical choice, and how this orients to and re-works the content of prior turns at talk, that the important courtroom business of what happened and who is to blame gets worked out.
Theme 2: Normalizing actions and events
Accounting for actions involves locating them with regard to a normative backdrop, itself discursively definable, in terms of which specific actions (also as defined) can be identified as typical, usual, conventional, or else abnormal and requiring a special account. Connected to normative legal issues such as sexual impropriety, perjury and witness tampering, one of the major themes of public, press, and Grand Jury interest in Clinton, was the suggestion of an inappropriately asymmetrical, exploitative relationship between the President and a junior intern in his employment. Concern with these themes was pervasive; extracts (1) and (2) have already included accounts by Clinton that build Lewinsky's responsibility for troublesome events, along with his own grasp of what was true, honest and proper.
In Extract (3) Q's question is directed at Clinton's responsibility for requesting the same meeting discussed in extracts (1) and (2), immediately following the publication of the witness list for the Jones trial.
Extract (3) Clinton testimony, p. 12. (.) before she left town, (1.0) but u-usually when we met she ↓requested the meetings.= And (.) 9 my recollection is that in nineteen ninety seven, 10 (0.6) she asked to meet with me several times 11 when I could not meet with her and did not do so,
12
(1.0) but it's quite possible that I s-that (.) 13 because she had given me a Christmas gift, a-
14
(1.0) and because she was leaving that I invited The contrastive emphases in line 1, on "you" and "requested", signal Q's points of concern here, that the fateful meeting was instigated by Clinton rather than Lewinsky (you rather than her), and "requested" rather than, say, a meeting that happened to take place at that time. Clinton's response is framed once again in terms of the limits of his memory (cf.
Extracts 1 and 2, and Bogen & Lynch, 1989 , on the 'plausible deniability' functions of not remembering), and he accedes to the possibility that he requested the meeting. But he works to routinize it. This is a robust rhetorical pattern, where the notion that one is specially accountable for an action or situation, such that a motive or account is required, is resisted by defining that action as commonplace, normal, or 'scripted' (Edwards, 1994 (Edwards, , 1995 (Edwards, , 1997 cf. Sacks, 1992) . In this case, Clinton defines the meeting as part of a recognizable, normatively understandable routine of gift exchanges and partings.
Again, note various significant details in Clinton's talk. The invitation, if indeed he issued it, would have been to "come by before she left town" (lines 5-6). The expression "come by" suggests something casual and brief, while "before she left town" (repeated in lines 16-17) provides the occasion for it (in contrast, say, to the recent publication of the witness list). Indeed, it was usually Lewinsky who requested their meetings rather than him (lines 6-7). Note the way "usually" is cut off and then corrected with emphasis, "u-usually" (line 6), and the contextual information provided by Clinton, that Lewinsky was trying to get to see him more often than he was available (lines 10-11). The picture, then, is of a series of meetings generally instigated by Lewinsky, with Clinton a less enthusiastic or available participant, but with the possibility that Clinton may indeed, exceptionally, have requested this particular meeting in order to perform two friendly social rituals that were due -a reciprocal Christmas gift exchange (line 13) and a parting (line 14). These are the kinds of normative reasons for a meeting that anybody might be expected to recognize. Even the expression "get a couple of gifts" (lines 15-16) plays down any special significance his gifts to her may have had, reinforcing their routine, seasonal, reciprocating status.
Although Clinton's move to normalize or routinize the meeting provides a counter to any other motive he may have had (e.g., witness-tampering), such a move need not succeed in closing the issue. In Extract (4), Q pursues Clinton's theme of gift exchange, questioning its routine nature on this occasion, and therefore its motives.
Extract (4) Clinton testimony, p. 13. Q suggests that the gift-giving event in question was not merely the routine sort, even for Clinton, but something unusual and excessive, in fact emphatically and extremely so -"the ↑most gifts that you had ever given her in a (.) single (.) uh ↑day" (lines 5-7). As Pomerantz (1986) shows, 'extreme case formulations' are used in rhetorical environments of this kind, in making contested events accountable. Recall Clinton's "get a couple of gifts", which we remarked on in extract (3), which contrasts both in agency (who does the giving or getting), and in how the importance of the event is built up or played down. Q's implication is that this particular gift giving may have had a special motivation over and above the socially routine. After a long, 4-second delay 4 Clinton accounts for the apparent excess; it was two occasions rolled into one, both Christmas and a going-away present, and also a reciprocation of a "particularly nice" present given him by Lewinsky (lines 10-12). So again, contrasting motives are made relevant by Q and Clinton, using the practical logic of how exceptional actions require special motive accounts, whereas routine ones do not.
Appeals to the normative, routine nature of events or action sequences is part of how actors' mental states and character traits are evidentially grounded (se Edwards, 1995, 1997, on 'script formulations' and 'dispositions') . This has a reflexive element, in that characterizations of a person in relationship to the speaker are available for, and may be designed for, their implications about the speaker. In extract (5) Lewinsky. What he can recall is how "upset" she was (lines 9-10).
Not only was Lewinsky memorably upset on that occasion, but we are immediately informed, parenthetically before continuing (lines 10-11), that "she got upset from time to time". This formulates Lewinsky as getting upset not just on the one occasion in question, but repeatedly. There is a common sense logical trajectory to this kind of generalization, which has been explored in work on causal attribution (e.g., Jones & Davies, 1965) and in discursive psychology (Edwards, 1995) . Doing something repetitively, across situations and occasions, provides grounds for dispositional inferences about the actor. It is implied that Lewinsky was perhaps prone to getting upset, such that any pursuit of the reasons for her getting upset, on any particular occasion, might look to reasons within her, and not only to local causes such as what (in this case) Clinton might have done or said to provoke her.
Note the detail in Clinton's formulation, the emphasis on the stative "got upset" (line 10), with its absence of causal agent -she just got upset occasionally. This is a particularly important rhetorical move on Clinton's part, deflecting inquiry away from the proximal causes of Lewinsky's emotions, and towards her dispositional tendencies (cf. the analysis of 'script formulations' and dispositional attributions in Edwards, 1994 Edwards, , 1995 . That depiction of a person prone to getting upset, prone to irrationality, is enhanced by the description of her unreasonable conduct and expectations. Note Clinton's implied difficulty with comprehending how Lewinsky "just sort of showed up and wanted to be let in" (lines 15-16), where the items "just" and "sort of" depict her actions as somewhat puzzling with regard to reasonable expectations. Again, in expressing such difficulty in understanding Lewinsky's behaviour, Clinton reflexively indexes himself as rational and sensible.
In contrast to Lewinsky's dispositional and situationally puzzling actions and emotions, Clinton was "upset about her conduct" (line 20), which was "inappropriate that day" (line 24). Rather than being prone to getting upset, Clinton emerges as understandably reactive to specific circumstances, which in this case were Lewinsky's unreasonable demands and reactions. Clinton reformulates Q's description of his emotions, from Q's emphatic "very i:rate" (lines 1, 5) to the less extreme, and contextually sensible, "I was upset" (line 20).
Further, the expression "we couldn't see her" (line 18), in contrast to the earlier "I couldn't see her" (line 12), defines the prospective meeting with Lewinsky as a kind of formal meeting, a matter for arrangement with his secretary, rather than any kind of intimate or clandestine tête-à-tête. The implication is that there is nothing to hide here, nothing important or culpable, just people getting upset, in Lewinsky's case unreasonably, at a failed effort to schedule a meeting.
In addition to his dispositional account of Lewinsky's emotionality, Clinton includes other references to her character. In extract (8) to "changed circumstances in her own life" (lines 2-3), with contrastive stress on "own", invokes a causal role for Lewinsky's life outside of their relationship, while introducing no specific details about it that might then be available for cross-examination or checked against other testimony (cf. Edwards & Potter, 1992a , on the rhetorical uses of 'systematic vagueness').
The one second silence (line 6), in which Q does not respond, leads to further elaboration. Clinton introduces (lines 7-9) the notion of a "disconnect" between Lewinsky's words and the reality of their relationship, where the "plain facts" correspond to his version of things. In contrast, Lewinsky's words and actions tell only of her own personal, psychological difficulties in a subjective world disconnected from reality, and outside of their no longer intimate relationship, located somewhere in "the rest of her life" (lines 12-13).
Note some of the detailed ways in which Clinton portrays this separation between Lewinsky's thoughts, words and responsibilities on the one hand, and his own conduct and grasp of plain factual reality on the other. For example, the word "sometimes" (line 7) again offers Lewinsky as prone, repeatedly and not just on this one occasion, to these kinds of disconnections. Similarly, "from the time I first met her" (line 14) dates Lewinsky's personal problems prior to, rather than caused by, her relationship with Clinton (cf. Edwards, 1995 Edwards, , 1997 , on the use of different start-points for contested narratives in relationship counselling).
Further, the uses of "I don't know" (lines 11, 13, and 22), and "it may be that…" (line 17), which frame or preface a series of suggestions about what was going on in her life and mind, convey a sense of Clinton making careful, conservative projections from limited personal knowledge, concerning Lewinsky's puzzling behaviour. Reflexively the impression Clinton provides is that of a careful, considerate observer and explainer of events. Clinton projects himself as a person of some integrity who, in spite of Lewinsky's needs and involvement, was the one who ended the inappropriate relationship, and with the best motives -he "did the right thing and made it stick" (line 18). Lewinsky's efforts to continue the intimacy beyond that point are depicted as irrational, being based in "a need to cling…" (line 19), despite what "she knew" (lines 21-22) to be the case.
CONCLUSIONS
We have approached the roles of memory, emotion and normativity in personal relationships from the perspective of discursive psychology. This entails examining conversational and textual materials in which psychological characteristics of the actors in narrated events, and of the current speaker, are handled as part of the actions that talk performs. Concepts of emotion and motivation, and other common sense psychological concepts including an ability or inability to remember something, have a role and nature in social life (cf. Mills, 1940, on motives) that can be explored by examining the details of situated talk. In examining those details we set aside our own concerns about truth, accuracy, error, and sincerity in the testimony under analysis, and leave those notions for participants to deal with. Our task has been to examine how they do it. Motives, emotions, thoughts, memories, and the detail and normativity of events to which they are attached, are studied for how they are invoked as part of talk's conceptual repertoire and interactional work.
The analysis has brought together a range of discourse devices that are not restricted to memory, emotion and motive talk, nor even to personal narratives, but are part of the general currency of talk and text, and revealed by the analysis of talk's detailed lexical choices and sequential organization. These devices included a variety of forms of everyday practical reasoning, such as:
(1) how particular actions can be described or worked up in narrative as either normative or exceptional, where exceptional actions require special motive accounts, and routine ones do not (cf. Sacks, 1992; Smith, 1978) . Clinton deployed that kind of descriptive-explanatory reasoning with regard to motives for meetings and gift exchanges.
(2) Actions can be descriptively built as either exceptional or typical of the actor, and therefore stemming either from circumstance or from disposition or character (cf. Jones & Davies, 1965; Edwards, 1995) . Clinton used the typical-dispositional link to depict Lewinsky's volatile emotions as stemming from her character, rather than being understandable reactions to things he did.
(3) Discursive uses of psychological categories (know, believe, recall, feel, etc.) are clearly not simply a matter of referring to private mental states but, rather, are part of how actions and actors are made publicly accountable. Their rhetorical uses are a feature of recent work in discursive psychology (e.g., Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, in press) . The extracts examined here are rich in psychological categories, and we focused on just a few of these, such as Clinton's rhetorical uses of know and remember, and his constructions of Lewinsky's disposition towards anger.
(4) Descriptions of persons in relationships and interactions are reflexively available for what they imply about the other persons in those relationships, and for the speaker (cf. Watson, 1983) . Thus, Clinton's depictions of Lewinsky carried reciprocal implications about his own emotions, goals and motives. The examination of such reflexive implications, in the details of a corpus of 'live' talk-in-interaction complete with reactions, uptakes, reformulations, shows how they are a systematic feature of the interactional, rhetorical work that the talk is handling and managing. Speaker's management of these kinds of reflexive implications of their talk is a largely neglected but potentially far-reaching theme in discursive psychology, following the initial promotion of the idea in Potter's (1992a, 1993) 'Discursive Action Model' of factual and causal-attributional accounts.
(5) There is a range of other devices, echoing work in conversation analysis on basic conversational processes, through which narrative description, accountability, blame, innocence, motive, sincerity, truth-telling, and so on, are interactionally produced and rhetorically orientated. These include 'repairs' in which speakers correct themselves and select alternative descriptions (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977) ; constructive 'formulations' of what they or another person has said so far (see the discussions of extracts (2) and (4) in particular, and Heritage & Watson, 1979) ; and 'membership category' relevancies (friend, lover, counsellor, etc. -see extract 5) that are used to provide normative and motivational bases for narrated actions (Sacks, 1992; Hester & Eglin, 1997; Watson, 1983) .
We highlighted in particular on the reflexive work done by Clinton's portrayal of Lewinsky's personal dispositions, motives, and emotional states. This was an important part of managing blame and responsibility for his own part, both in the events narrated, and in the production of credible and consistent testimony. In producing stories and descriptions that built a picture of Lewinsky's problematic conduct and character, Clinton attended simultaneously to his own motives, actions and limited culpability, these matters being what was primarily at stake in this presidential cross-examination. Lewinsky's disposition toward irrationality and heightened emotions, together with the same vulnerability that threatened Clinton's presidential reputation in having an affair with her, provided the basis for various alternative accounts he was able to offer, of key and controversial events and readings of events. Rather than exploiting a young and vulnerable White House intern, and persuading her to lie on his behalf under oath, he was helping and counselling an emotionally vulnerable friend with whom he had responsibly ended some regrettably "inappropriate contact". Her long-standing emotional problems predated that contact, and therefore his responsibility for them, such that their continuing relationship was motivated by her clinging vulnerability and his responsible, friendly, counsellor-like concern for her well being, along with a normal routine (especially for him) of exchanging gifts at socially appropriate times. Clinton's accounts of interactions with Lewinsky worked to soften or rebut any notions of perjury and exploitation, while attending to any notion that he was constructing his accounts precisely to those ends.
Finally, Clinton's detailed talk about his involvement with Lewinsky, including all the fine grain invocations of psychological states, their causes and consequences, and their reflexive implications for his own character and motives, were substantially the ways in which he oriented to and handled the major matters at issue in the setting at large. They were the details on which hung, in that legal setting, a potentially mendacious and culpable abuse of his office as president of the United States. Again, along with talk's reflexivity, this orientation of the details of talk, to the psychological business through which a range of 27 applied settings work (such as court rooms, counselling, education, police interrogations, medical settings, political arenas), is a growth point for further developments in discursive psychology (Edwards & Potter, 2001; cf. Drew & Heritage, 1992 Page references for data extracts are to the publicly available transcripts, which do not contain the various conversation-analytic enhancements and corrections provided in our extracts. 'Q' is the cross-examining Grand Jury questioner, and 'C' is Clinton.
Various different questioners took part in the recorded testimony, but that is not a feature of our analysis. 3 We use the notion of 'pure memory', unadulterated by pragmatic considerations, rhetorically here. We do not mean to endorse the psychological reality of any such notion. 4 Four seconds is a long silence in everyday conversation (Jefferson, 1989) , but such silences are a pervasive feature of Clinton's testimony here. It may have a special significance in this context, of conveying especially careful deliberation, as part of conveying a concern for accurate recall and truthful testimony on significant, controversial, potentially damaging matters. 5 Long term emotional problems in Lewinsky's life outside of and prior to her relationship with Clinton are invoked and hinted at several times in his testimony, perhaps most explicitly on page 43 of the published transcript, where he says she was "burdened by some unfortunate conditions of her upbringing". 6 Although we cannot go into this in any detail here, Q's many repetitions of Clinton's own descriptions, often carefully and emphatically enunciated when put back to him, start to sound ironic and euphemistic, pointing up the rhetorical nature of Clinton's carefully articulated testimony.
APPENDIX: Transcription Symbols
These are derived from the system developed mainly by Gail Jefferson for conversation analysis (see also Atkinson & Heritage, 1984) .
[ ] Square brackets mark the start and end of overlapping speech, aligned with the talk immediately above or below.
↑ ↓ Vertical arrows precede marked pitch movement.
Underlining
Emphasis; the extent of underlining within individual words locates emphasis, but also indicates how heavy it is.
CAPITALS
Speech that is obviously louder than surrounding speech. o ↑I know it, o Raised circles ('degree' signs) enclose obviously quieter speech.
(0.4) Numbers in round brackets measure pauses in seconds; in this case, 4 tenths of a second.
(.) A micropause, hearable but too short to measure.
she wa::nted Colons show degrees of elongation of the prior sound; the more colons the more elongation, roughly one colon per syllable length.
hhh Aspiration (out-breaths); proportionally as for colons.
.hhh Inspiration (in-breaths).
Yeh, Commas mark weak rising or continuing intonation, as used sometimes in enunciating lists, or in signalling that the speaker may have more to say.
y'know? Question marks signal stronger, 'questioning' intonation, irrespective of grammar.
Yeh. Periods (stops) mark falling, stopping intonation, irrespective of grammar, and of whether the speaker actually stops talking.
bu-u-hyphens mark a cut-off of the preceding sound. >he said< 'greater than' and 'lesser than' signs enclose speeded-up talk.
solid.= We had 'Equals' signs mark the immediate 'latching' of successive talk, whether of one or more speakers, with no interval.
(...) This shows where some talk has been omitted from a data extract or from within a turn at speaking.
